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By MARCO BATTAGLINI*
To study how a ﬁrm can capitalize on a long-term customer relationship, we
characterize the optimal contract between a monopolist and a consumer whose
preferences follow a Markov process. The optimal contract is nonstationary and has
inﬁnite memory, but is described by a simple state variable. Under general condi-
tions, supply converges to the efﬁcient level for any degree of persistence of the
types and along any history, though convergence is history-dependent. In contrast,
as with constant types, the optimal contract can be renegotiation-proof, even with
highly persistent types. These properties provide insights into the optimal ownership
structure of the production technology. (JEL D23, D42, D82)
Advances in information processing and new
management strategies have made long-term,
nonanonymous relations between buyers and
sellers feasible in an increasing number of mar-
kets. Many retailers can now store large data-
bases on consumers’ choices and utilize them
for pricing decisions at a very low cost. In part
because of these new technologies, recent man-
agerial schools have stressed the importance of
capitalizing on long-term relations with custom-
ers (see, e.g., Louis V. Gerstner, Jr., 2002, and
Jack Welch, 2001). When a long-term relation-
ship is nonanonymous and types are persistent,
the seller can mitigate the problem of asymmet-
ric information by using consumers’ choices to
forecast future behavior. As a result, however,
buyers are more reluctant to reveal private in-
formation that affects their consumption deci-
sions: their strategic reaction may limit or even
eliminate the beneﬁts for the seller. The existing
literature has studied this problem, focusing on
those cases in which the consumer’s type is
constant over time.
1 Here, it is well known that
the seller ﬁnds it optimal to offer the optimal
static contract period after period. In a sense, the
seller commits not to use the information gath-
ered from the consumer’s choices.
A model of long-term contracting that as-
sumes constant types, however, clearly misses
an important dimension of the problem. Con-
sider the case of a monopolist selling to an
entrepreneur whose type depends on the num-
ber of customers waiting for service. As is well
known, under standard assumptions on the ar-
rival rate of customers, the type of this entre-
preneur follows a Markov process (see, e.g.,
Samuel Karlin and Howard M. Taylor, 1975).
Or, to give another example, consider the case
of a company selling cellular telephones. These
contracts often last for years and it would not be
reasonable to assume that the telephone com-
pany, or the customer, does not take into ac-
count the likely, but uncertain, evolution of
preferences (see, e.g., Eugenio J. Miravete,
2003, for evidence). In all these situations, the
assumption that the consumer’s type is constant
is clearly not realistic. Even if types are very
persistent, it is reasonable to assume that they
may vary over time and follow a stochastic
process.
In this paper, we characterize the optimal
contract offered in an inﬁnitely repeated setting
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637by a monopolist to a consumer whose prefer-
ences evolve following a Markov process. In
this case, even if types are highly persistent,
the contract is very different from the contract
with constant types because the seller ﬁnds it
optimal to use information acquired along the
interaction in a truly dynamic way. For this
reason, the characterization of the optimal con-
tract when there is heterogeneity within and
across periods allows a new understanding of
important aspects of a dynamic principal-agent
relationship that previous models could not cap-
ture—particularly, with regard to the memory
and complexity of the contract, its efﬁciency,
and its robustness to renegotiation. Perhaps sur-
prisingly, it also provides insights into the op-
timal ownership structure of the production
technology.
As noted, when types are constant, the con-
tract has no memory and the inefﬁciency of the
optimal static contract is repeated period after
period. With persistent but stochastic types,
even in a simple stationary environment with
one period memory (i.e., a Markov process), the
contract is nonstationary and has inﬁnite mem-
ory; despite this, however, it can be represented
in a very economical way by a simple state
variable. Even if types are arbitrarily highly
correlated and the discount factor is arbitrarily
small, the seller’s optimal offer converges over
time to the efﬁcient supply schedule along all
possible histories. The speed of convergence,
however, is state contingent and occurs in a
particular way, which extends a well-known
property of the static model. On the one hand, in
fact, we have a generalized no distortion at the
top (GNDT) principle: after any history, if the
agent reveals himself to have the highest possi-
ble marginal valuation for the good, supply is
set efﬁciently from that date onward in any
inﬁnite history that may follow. On the other
hand, and more importantly, we have a novel
vanishing distortion at the bottom (VDB) prin-
ciple: even in the history in which the agent
always reveals to have the lowest marginal val-
uation for the good, the contract converges to
the efﬁcient menu offer. One immediate impli-
cation of this result is that in the “steady state,”
or even after a few periods, the monopolist’s
supply schedule may be empirically indistin-
guishable from the outcome of an efﬁcient
competitive market; moreover, since higher ef-
ﬁciency is associated with a higher consumer
rent, it explains why “old” customers should be
treated more favorably than “new” customers.
2
In a stochastic environment, the incentives
for renegotiation are also very different. As
shown in the received literature (see discussion
below) when types are constant over time, the
monopolist beneﬁts from the ability to commit
to not renegotiating the contract, because the
optimal contract is never time-consistent. With
variable types, in contrast, this is not the case:
indeed, even when types are highly correlated, a
simple and easily satisﬁed condition guarantees
renegotiation-proofness. Interestingly, when
types are constant the optimal renegotiation-
proof contract always requires the agent to use
sophisticated mixed strategies: with correlated
but stochastic types, the optimal renegotiation-
proof contract has an equilibrium in pure strat-
egies and simply requires the agent to report his
type.
There is an intuitive argument which explains
the dynamics of the distortions in the optimal
contract and the efﬁciency result mentioned ear-
lier. Assume that the agent’s type can take two
values: high and low marginal valuation for the
good (respectively, H and L). Consider Fig-
ure 1, which shows the impact on proﬁts at time
zero of a marginal increase q in the quantity
q(ht) offered to the consumer after a history ht.
On the one hand, this change increases the
surplus that can potentially be appropriated by
the seller if history ht is realized (which is
represented by the “thick arrow” on the left-
hand panel in Figure 1).
3 However, as in a static
model, this increase in supply increases the rent
that the principal must leave to the agent to
satisfy incentive compatibility. In every period,
optimal supply is determined by this marginal
cost–marginal beneﬁt trade-off, and the dy-
namic properties of the contract are driven by its
evolution. To determine optimal supply, there-
fore, it is important to understand the impact
over expected rents of this change at time t.
To this goal, consider the right panel of Fig-
ure 1 and assume that the rent of the high type
2 See Igal Hendel and Alessandro Lizzeri (2003) and
Georges Dionne and Neil A. Doherty (1994) for evidence of
this phenomenon.
3 Because consumption is always distorted below its ﬁrst
best level, starting from the seller’s optimum, a marginal
increase in supply after history ht corresponds to an increase
in efﬁciency of the contract at that node.
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expected utility of the agent in the history im-
mediately preceding ht increases as well be-
cause, although the agent is a low type at t  1,
he can become a high type in the following
period, and then beneﬁt from the increase in
rent. Part of this extra expected rent can be
extracted by the seller at t  1, but not all, since
incentive compatibility must be satisﬁed at that
time as well. At time t  1, the high type cannot
receive less than what he would receive if he
chose the option designed for the low type.
Even if the seller extracts all the expected in-
crease in consumption of the low type with an
increase in price pt1  Pr(HL)Rt at t  1,
the change in rent of the high type at t  1,
Rt1, would be equal to Pr(HH)Rt 
pt1, that is, (Pr(HH)  Pr(HL))Rt,
4
which is positive if types are positively corre-
lated. If the seller tries to extract this extra rent
at t  1, then, repeating the same argument, she
still must provide an increase in rent to the high
type at time t  2 equal to Rt2 
(Pr(HH)  Pr(HL))Rt1, which can be
written as (Pr(HH)  Pr(HL))
2Rt. Pro-
ceeding backward, we arrive at an increase in
the rent left to the consumer at time 1 propor-
tional to (Pr(HH)  Pr(HL))
t1 (see the
dashed arrows in the right panel of Figure 1).
While the marginal impact of the change in
supply on expected surplus evaluated at time
zero is proportional to the probability of the
history ht (i.e., LPr(LL)
t1), the impact on
the agent’s expected rent is proportional to the
“cumulative effect” of the difference in expec-
tations of the types: [Pr(HH)  Pr(HL)]
t1.
5
Accordingly, the marginal cost–marginal bene-






The dynamics of the optimal contract depends
on the evolution of this cost-beneﬁt ratio. When
types are constant, the term in parentheses is
exactly equal to one, so (1) is independent of t
and the distortion is constant: this explains why,
with constant types, it is optimal to offer the
static contract repeatedly. When types are pos-
itively but imperfectly correlated, even if types
are highly persistent, optimal supply converges
to an efﬁcient level along all histories as t 3 
because (1) converges to zero.
In general, any change in the contract at a
time t has cascade effects on the expected rents
in the previous periods. These effects depend
not only on the transition probabilities, but also
on the structure of the constraints that are bind-
ing at the optimum. As time passes, these cas-
cade effects become increasingly complicated
because the number of histories grows exponen-
tially. A methodological contribution of this
paper is in a novel characterization of the bind-
ing constraints by an inductive argument which
4 The probability that a type i in period t becomes a type
j in t  1 is denoted Pr(ji).
5 The expected change in the agent’s rent at time one is
H[Pr(HH)  Pr(HL)]
t1Rt, where H is the proba-
bility that the agent is a high type in the ﬁrst period. The
constant H, however, is irrelevant for our argument.
FIGURE 1. MARGINAL COST AND BENEFIT OF A CHANGE IN THE QUANTITY OFFERED AFTER HISTORY ht
Notes: The arrows represent the history tree: an arrow pointing up (respectively, down) represents a high (respectively, low)
type realization. The horizontal axis is the time line.
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problem.
The particular features of the optimal contract
described above also have implications for the
optimal ownership structure of the monopolist’s
business. It is indeed interesting to ask why the
monopolist keeps control of the production
technology: after all, only the consumer beneﬁts
directly from it and has information for its ef-
ﬁcient use. We show that the optimal contract
can be interpreted as offering the high-type con-
sumer a call option to buy out the technology
used by the monopolist. The sale of the tech-
nology, however, is state contingent and the
monopolist tends to retain control more often
than what would be socially optimal: by keep-
ing the ownership rights, the monopolist can
control future rents of the high types and this
improves surplus extraction because types have
different expectations for the future. This in-
sight seems relevant to understand the owner-
ship structure of a new technology. The initial
owner of a new technology generally has mo-
nopoly power on its use thanks to a patent and
must decide if it is more convenient to use the
technology directly selling its products, or to
sell the patent.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I
surveys the related literature. In Section II we
describe the model. In Section III we character-
ize the optimal contract and discuss its efﬁ-
ciency properties. Section IV discusses the
theory of property rights that follows from the
characterization. Section V discusses the prop-
erties of the monetary payments in the optimal
contract. Section VI studies renegotiation-
proofness. Section VII presents concluding
comments.
I. Related Literature
As mentioned above, in dynamic models of
price discrimination it is generally assumed that
the agent’s type is constant over time.
6 In this
case we have a “false dynamics” in which the
monopolist ﬁnds it optimal to commit to a con-
tract in which past information is ignored and
the optimal static menu is repeated in every
period (see, e.g., Laffont and Tirole, 1993).
With constant types the dynamics becomes
interesting only when other constraints are
binding, in particular when a renegotiation-
proofness constraint must be satisﬁed. Seminal
papers in this literature are Dewatripont (1989),
Oliver Hart and Tirole (1988), and Laffont and
Tirole (1990).
7 In contrast to our ﬁndings with
variable types, a common result in this literature
with constant types is that the ex ante optimal
contract is never renegotiation-proof.
Kevin Roberts (1982) and Robert M.
Townsend (1982) are the ﬁrst to present re-
peated principal-agent models with stochastic
types. In these frameworks, however, types are
serially independent realizations, and therefore
incentives for present and future actions can
easily be separated. Indeed, in this case, except
for the ﬁrst period, there is no asymmetric in-
formation between the principal and the agent
because both share the same expectation for the
future.
8 David Baron and David Besanko
(1984) and Laffont and Tirole (1996) extend
this research, presenting two period procure-
ment models in which the type in the second
period is stochastic and correlated with the type
in the ﬁrst period. Because these models have
only two periods, however, they cannot capture
such important aspects of the dynamics of the
optimal contract as its memory and complexity
after long histories, or its convergence to efﬁ-
ciency. Aldo Rustichini and Asher Wolinsky
(1995) characterize optimal pricing in a model
with inﬁnite horizon and Markovian types as
ours. However, in their model consumers are
not strategic and ignore that future prices de-
pend on their current actions; demand, more-
over, can assume two values, zero or one. None
6 For excellent overviews of the literature on dynamic
contracting, see Patrick Bolton and Mathias Dewatripont
(2005) and Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole (1993).
7 These papers study the optimal renegotiation-proof
contract with constant types under different assumptions.
Hart and Tirole (1988) and Dewatripont (1989) present
models with many periods: the ﬁrst paper assumes that
supply can have two values, zero or one; the second focuses
on pure strategies and assumes some simpliﬁcations in the
nature of the contractual agreement. Laffont and Tirole
(1990) solve a model in which supply can assume more than
two values, assuming two periods.
8 Because Townsend (1982) is speciﬁcally interested in
modelling risk sharing, he assumes that the principal is less
risk averse than the agent. In this case, even with i.i.d. types,
the contract depends on the cumulated wealth of the agent.




We consider a model with two parties, a
buyer and a seller. The buyer repeatedly buys a
nondurable good from the seller. He enjoys a
per-period utility tq  p for q units of the good
bought at a price p. In every period, the seller
produces the good with a cost function c(q) 
1⁄2 q
2. The marginal beneﬁt t evolves over time
according to a Markov process. To focus on the
dynamics of the contract, we consider the sim-
plest case in which each period the agent can
assume one of two types, L, H with  
H  L  0. The probability that state l is
reached if the agent is in state k is denoted
Pr(lk)  (0, 1); the distribution of types con-
ditional on being a high (low) type is denoted
H  (Pr(HH), Pr(LH)) (L  (Pr(HL),
Pr(LL))). We assume that types are positively
correlated, i.e., Pr(HH)  Pr(HL). How-
ever, we do not make assumptions on the degree
of correlation: indeed, an environment with
constant types can be seen as a limiting case of
our model in which the probability that a type
does not change converges to one. In each pe-
riod the consumer observes the realization of his
own type; the seller, in contrast, cannot see it.
At date 0 the seller has a prior   (H, L)o n
the agent’s type.
10 For future reference, note
that the efﬁcient level of output is equal to
q
e(t)  t in all periods and after any history of
realizations of the types.
We assume that the relationship between the
buyer and the seller is inﬁnitely repeated and the
discount factor is   (0, 1). In period 1 the seller
offers a supply contract to the buyer. The buyer
can reject the offer or accept it; in the latter case
the buyer can walk away from the relationship
at any time t  1 if the expected continuation
utility offered by the contract falls below the
reservation value u   0. In line with the stan-
dard model of price discrimination, the monop-
olist commits to the contract that is offered: in
Section VI we relax this assumption, allowing
the parties to renegotiate the contract.
It is easy to show that in the environment that
we will study a form of the revelation principle
is valid and allows us to consider without loss of
generality only contracts that in each period t
depend on the revealed type at time t and on the
history of previous type revelations. In this case
the contract 	p, q
 can be written as 	p, q

(pt( ˆht), qt( ˆht))t1
 , where ht and  ˆ are, respec-
tively, the public history and the type revealed
at time t, and qt and pt are the quantities and
prices conditional on the declaration and the
history.
11 In general, ht can be deﬁned recur-
sively as ht : { ˆ
t1, ht1}, h1 : A where
 ˆ
t1 is the type revealed in period t  1. The set
of possible histories at time t is denoted Ht; the
set of histories at time j following a history ht
(t  j) is denoted Hj(ht). A strategy for a seller
consists of offering a direct mechanism 	p, q
 as
described above. The strategy of a consumer is,
at least potentially, contingent on a richer his-
tory ht
C : { ˆ
t1, t, ht1
C }, h1
C : 1 because
the agent always knows his own type. For a
given contract, a strategy for the consumer,
then, is simply a function that maps a history ht
C
into a revealed type: ht
C  b(ht
C).
In the study of static models it is often as-
sumed that all types are served, i.e., each type is
offered a positive quantity, which is guaranteed
by the assumption that  is not too large. The
same condition that guarantees this property in
the static model also guarantees it in our dy-
namic model; therefore, to simplify notation,
we assume that this condition is veriﬁed in our
model.
12 This assumption can easily be relaxed,
9 Dynamic environments with adverse selection and sto-
chastic types have recently been used to study models of
leasing, insurance, and other applications. See Pascal
Courty and Hao Li (2000), and Hendel and Lizzeri (1999,
2003). John Kennan (2001) has studied a model with vari-
able types, but in which only short-term contracts with one
period length can be offered. Battaglini and Stephen Coate
(2003) apply the techniques of the present paper to charac-
terize the Pareto optimal frontier of taxation with correlated
types.
10 The fact that the agent’s type follows a Markov pro-
cess can be modelled in many natural ways. The agent may
be a ﬁrm whose type depends on its list of customers
waiting for services, which according to the “inventory
model” follows a Markov process (see Karlin and Taylor,
1975, §2.2.d). Or the agent’s type may depend on his
investment opportunities: if these follow a branching pro-
cess, then they are described by a Markov process (see
Karlin and Taylor, 1975, §2.2.f).
11 Note, therefore, that p(h) is not the per-unit price
paid after history {, h}, but the total monetary transfer at
that history.
12 The condition that guarantees that all types are served
is   (L/H)L. As we will see, the distortion introduced
641 VOL. 95 NO. 3 BATTAGLINI: LONG-TERM CONTRACTING WITH MARKOVIAN CONSUMERSbut this would complicate notation with no gain
in insight.
In the ﬁrst part of the analysis we focus on the
case with unilateral commitment in which the
monopolist can commit, but the consumer can
leave the relationship anytime. This assumption
seems the most appropriate in many markets.
13
On the other hand, there are many situations in
which renegotiation is an important component
of the problem: in Section VI, we show that
under general conditions the optimal contract is
renegotiation-proof and therefore it can be ap-
plied to these environments too.
III. The Optimal Contract
The monopolist’s optimal choice of contract
maximizes proﬁts under the constraint that after
any history the consumer receives (at least) his
reservation utility and, also after any history,








Eh1, Lt  L
]
s.t. IChtH, IChtL, IRhtH,
IRhtL  ht
where E[(h1, i)t  i] i  H, L is the
expected value function of the monopolist after
history {h1, i}. The incentive constraints
ICht(i) for i  H, L are described by:
IChti qihti  piht
	 EUht, it  i

 qjhti  pjht
	 EUht, jt  i

@i  j, i, j  H, L, where U(ht, i) is the value
function of a type  after a history {ht, i}.
These constraints guarantee that type i does not
want to imitate type j after any history ht. And
the individual rationality constraint IRht(i) sim-
ply requires that the agent wants to participate
in the relationship each period: U(ht, i)  0
for any i and ht.
The classic approach to characterize the so-
lution to this problem in a static environment is
in two steps. First, a simpliﬁed program, in
which the participation constraints of the high
type and the incentive compatibility constraints
of the low type are ignored, is considered (the
“relaxed problem”). Then it is shown that there
is no loss of generality in restricting attention to
this case. In a static model, the remaining con-
straints of the relaxed problem are necessarily
binding at the optimal solution: this simpliﬁes
the analysis because it allows us to substitute
them directly in the objective function.
It is easy, however, to see that in a dynamic
model this cannot be true. Given an optimal
contract, we can always add a “borrowing”
agreement in which the monopolist receives a
payment at time t and pays it back in the fol-
lowing periods. If the net present value of this
transaction is zero, then neither the monopo-
list’s proﬁt changes, nor any constraint, would
be violated, so the contract would remain opti-
mal: but the individual rationality constraints
need not remain binding after some histories.
More importantly, the incentive compatibility
constraints may also not be binding. In order to
provide incentives to the high type to reveal his
private information, the monopolist may ﬁnd it
useful to use future payoffs instead of present
payoffs to screen the agent’s types. If this were
the case, there would be a history after which
the contract leaves to the high type more surplus
than what a binding incentive compatibility
constraint would imply.
The following result generalizes the “binding
constraints” result of the static model, showing
that in a dynamic setting, although constraints
by the monopolist is declining over time in all histories and,
in the ﬁrst period, it is equal to the distortion of the static
model. Therefore if the monopolist serves all customers in
the static model, then she serves all customers after all
histories in our dynamic model too.
13 Discussing the life insurance market, Hendel and Liz-
zeri observe that the term value contracts in the insurance
market which account for 37 percent of ordinary life insur-
ance, “... are unilateral: the insurance companies must re-
spect the terms of the contract for the duration, but the buyer
can look for better deals at any time. [...] These features ﬁt
a model of unilateral commitment.” (Hendel and Lizzeri,
2003, p. 302). Moreover, there is evidence that ﬁrms seem
aware that the possibility to commit is important to win
exclusive long-term contracts.
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no loss of generality in assuming that con-
straints in the relaxed problem are satisﬁed as
equalities. Let us deﬁne PII as the program in
which expected proﬁts are maximized, assum-
ing that the incentive constraints of the high
type and the participation constraints of the low
type hold as equalities after any history, and no
other constraint is assumed. We say that a sup-
ply schedule q* t(ht) is a solution of a given
program if there exists a payment schedule
p* t(ht) such that the menu {q* t(ht), p* t(ht)}
is a solution of the program.
LEMMA 1: The supply schedule q* t(ht)
solves PI if and only if it solves PII.
The result that the constraints may be assumed
to hold as equalities without loss may be intu-
itively explained in a two-period version of the
model (the complete argument, presented in the
Appendix, is by induction on t). Assume that at
time t2 the incentive compatibility constraint of
the high type is not binding after a history h2L.
Consider this change in the contract: reduce the
extra rent at t  2 and reduce the price paid by the
low type at t  1 so that his participation con-
straint is satisﬁed as an equality after the change.
The rent of the high type at time 1 depends on his
outside option (the utility obtained by reporting
himself untruthfully to be a low type), so it is
affected by both these changes. Even if the net
change in payments has a neutral effect on the low
type’s expected utility, however, it will reduce the
outside option of the high type: because the high
type is more optimistic about the future realization
of his type, the reduction in future rents if he
reports his type untruthfully will be larger than the
increase in payments at time t. If the value of the
high type’s outside option goes down, then his
equilibrium rent goes down as well. Expected
proﬁts, therefore, would be larger after the change
in the contract and all constraints would be re-
spected: but this is not possible if the contract is
optimal, so we have a contradiction. After a his-
tory h2  H we proceed in a similar way: in this
case proﬁts remain constant after the change in
prices, so the constraint needs not necessarily be
binding at the optimum, but it can be reduced to an
equality without loss. The argument for the par-
ticipation constraints is analogous.
It is important to point out that Lemma 1 does
not claim that any solution 	p, q
 of a relaxed
problem in which the incentive constraint of the
low type and the participation constraint of the
high type are ignored is a solution of PI.I nPII
we assume that the constraints are satisﬁed as
equalities, so it is not just a relaxed version of
PI. Indeed, such a claim would not be true:
some solutions of the relaxed problem would
imply future rents for the high type that would
violate the incentive compatibility constraint of
the low type after some histories. However, if
	p, q
 solves the relaxed problem, then there
exists a p such that 	p, q
 solves PI; and if 	p,
q
 solves PI then there exists a p such that 	p,
q
 solves PII and, because of this, solves the
relaxed problem as well.
We can now focus the simpler problem with
equality constraints PII; from the ﬁrst-order
conditions, we obtain:
PROPOSITION 1: At any time t, the optimal
contract is characterized by the supply
function:








if   L and ht  ht
L




L : {L, L, ... L}, the history along
which the agent always reports himself to be a
low type in the ﬁrst t  1 periods.
From (2) we can see that the optimal contract
is nonstationary and has unbounded memory:
for any T  0, we can always ﬁnd two histories
that are identical for the last T periods but that
induce different menus in the optimal mecha-
nism.
14 This fact, however, does not imply that
14 Consider two histories that differ only in the ﬁrst
realization of types, the ﬁrst being high, the second being
low, and which have low realizations in any period follow-
ing date two. If these histories are longer than a positive
parameter T, say they have T  1 length, then they coincide
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Proposition 1 we can see that the only thing that
matters for the contract is whether we are on the
lower branch or not. Since this depends only on
the current type, and if in the previous periods
the agent reported himself to be a high type, the
state can be described by a simple 0-1 variable
which can be deﬁned recursively:
(3) Xt  Xt, Xt1

1i f Xt1  1 and t  L
0 else
for t  1, and X0  1. This variable starts with
value one and remains one if the agent persists
in reporting a low type; once the agent has
reported himself to be a high type, the state
switches to zero and remains constant forever.
Let us deﬁne [Pr(HH)  Pr(HL)/
Pr(LL)]; we have:
PROPOSITION 2: The optimal solution is a
function of time and the 0-1 state variable de-
scribed by (3): q* t(t, Xt1)  t  (H/
L)X(t, Xt1)
t1.
The length of the memory of the optimal
contract is a central issue in the literature on
dynamic moral hazard (see William P. Roger-
son, 1985), but it has not been studied in ad-
verse selection models, because when the
agent’s type is perfectly constant we know that
the contract is also constant over time and in-
dependent of past histories, so it has no mem-
ory. In the moral hazard literature, the memory
of the contract is a direct consequence of the
agent’s risk aversion. With risk aversion, it is
optimal not only to smooth consumption over
states of the world, as in the static moral hazard
framework, but also to smooth consumption
over periods. To this end, the contract must
keep track of the past realizations of the agent’s
income. In the model presented above, how-
ever, the agent is risk neutral; the persistence of
the distortion, therefore, does not depend on
consumption smoothing, but it is a necessary
feature of dynamic price discrimination. In a
dynamic environment, the principal has more
freedom to redistribute distortions over time
and states in order to screen the agent’s types.
Propositions 1 and 2 characterize the optimal
way to redistribute the distortion, proving that
the principal ﬁnds it optimal to introduce dis-
tortions even in the far future, potentially for an
unbounded number of periods. This is perhaps
surprising since the agent’s taste follows a
Markov process and therefore the relevant eco-
nomic environment has a memory of only one
period.
15
We now turn to the particular pattern in
which distortions are introduced. In Sections III
A and III B we discuss the dynamics of distor-
tions and the asymptotic properties of the con-
tract as  3 1. In Section III C, we discuss the
key assumptions of the model.
A. Efﬁciency: The GNDT and VDB Principles
In order to interpret (2), it is useful to com-
pare it with the benchmark with constant types.
In this case, there are only two possible histo-
ries: either the agent is always a high type, in
which case the contract is efﬁcient; or the agent
is always a low type, and the contract is dis-
torted below the efﬁcient level in all periods by
a constant (H/L).
When types follow a Markov process, the
contract instantly becomes efﬁcient as soon as
the agent reports himself to be a high type: but
now efﬁciency “invades” the histories in which
the agent subsequently reports himself to be a
low type. This is the generalized no distortion
at the top (GNDT) principle. Its intuition is the
following. Distortions are introduced only to
extract more surplus from higher types; there-
fore there is no reason to distort the quantity
offered to the highest type. After any history ht
the rent that must be paid to a high type to
reveal himself is independent of the quantities
that follow this history: since the incentive com-
patibility constraint for the high type is binding,
for at least the last T periods. At time 1 the monopolist
offers an efﬁcient contract in the ﬁrst history, i.e., regardless
of the realizations in the following periods, the quantity
offered is efﬁcient in any period following the ﬁrst. Not so
for the second history. Therefore, even if there is no intrin-
sic economic reason in the environment to offer different
menus at date T  1, the contracts are different.
15 As we discuss in greater detail in Section IV, the fact
that the seller wants to distort supply for a unlimited and
state-contingent number of periods has important implica-
tions for the allocation of the property rights of the produc-
tion technology.
644 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW JUNE 2005he receives the same utility as if he falsely
reported himself to be a low type; therefore,
only the quantities that follow such a history
affect his rents. This implies that the monopolist
is residual claimant on the surplus generated on
histories after a high type report, and therefore
the quantities that follow such histories are cho-
sen efﬁciently. In our dynamic framework, this
simple principle has strong implications be-
cause it forces the contract to be efﬁcient not
only in the ﬁrst period in which the agent truth-
fully reveals himself to be a high type, but also
in all the following periods.
A distortion persists on the lowest branch
of the history tree (i.e., when the agent al-
ways declares to be a low type). By a sim-
ple manipulation of the formula in Proposition
2, the distortion can be written as L  q* t(Lht)
 (H/L)X(t, Xt1){1  [Pr(LH)/
Pr(LL)]}
t1, since the efﬁcient level of
output with a low type is L. Given that types
are positively correlated, we have [Pr(LH)/
Pr(LL)]  (0, 1) and it follows that
limt3q* t(ht)    q
e(), which proves:
PROPOSITION 3: For any discount factor
  (0, 1), the optimal contract converges over
time to an efﬁcient contract along any possible
history.
This is the vanishing distortion at the bottom
(VDB) principle. The monopolist introduces a
distortion along the “lowest” history because
this minimizes the cost of screening the agent’s
types: however, even this distortion converges
to zero as t 3 .
The optimal distortion simply equalizes the
marginal cost of a decrease in supply (in terms
of reduced surplus generated in the relationship)
and its marginal beneﬁt (in terms of reduced
rent to be paid to the high type). With constant
types, after any history ht in which the agent
declares to be a low type, the marginal beneﬁt
of increasing surplus with a higher q(ht)i si n -
dependent of the length of the history: it is
proportional only to L, because once the type
is low in the ﬁrst period then it is low forever.
Similarly, the marginal cost of an increase in
q(ht) is proportional to H, the probability that
the high type receives the increase in the rent.
Since, therefore, the marginal cost/marginal
beneﬁt ratio is time-independent, it is not sur-
prising that the optimal distortion is also con-
stant over time. Indeed, the case with constant
types is not asymptotically efﬁcient because
{1  [Pr(LH)/Pr(LL)]}
t1 is exactly one,
and therefore, independent from t.
Clearly, as the persistence of types converges
to one, we have that [Pr(LH)/Pr(LL)] 3 0.
Not surprisingly, this implies that ceteribus pa-
ribus the contract converges in every period to
the optimal static contract as Pr(HH) and
Pr(LL) converge to one. There are, however,
two important observations. First, convergence
to efﬁciency appears to be relatively fast even if
types are highly correlated.
16 Second, as we
discuss below, the results with ﬁxed and sto-
chastic types are very different when  3 1,
regardless of the level of persistence of the
types.
B. Distribution of Surplus with Large
Discount Factors
All the results presented above are valid for
any   (0, 1); if we assume that  3 1, even
stronger results emerge. In this case we can
easily bound the inefﬁciency and determine the
distribution of surplus between the seller and
the buyer.
17
With constant types, the average utility of the
consumer is bounded away from zero and inde-
pendent of ; the average payoff of the monop-
olist is equal to the proﬁt that would be achieved
in a static model and independent of  as well.
However, even an arbitrarily small reduction in
the persistence of the types has a very high
impact on surplus and payoffs when the dis-
count factor is high.
16 Assume, for example, that types are ex ante equally
likely, and the types are very much correlated (for example,
the type is persistent 80 percent of the time). Then the
expected inefﬁciency of the contract after ten periods will
be 0.03779; the expected inefﬁciency after 50 periods
will be 5.0517  10
12.
17 In this comparative statics exercise we change the
discount factor, keeping the transition probabilities con-
stant. Another interesting exercise would be to modify the
level of persistence of the types, or the frequency of their
changes. Increasing the frequency of changes would rein-
force the effects of an increase in . But when we simulta-
neously increase types persistence and the discount factor,
the result depends on which of the two (persistence and )
converges faster to one. The case considered in the paper, in
which only  3 1, corresponds to the case in which the
discount factor converges more quickly than persistence.
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correlated, even if correlation is not positive,
then as  3 1 the average proﬁt of the monop-
olist converges to the ﬁrst-best level of surplus
and the average utility of the consumer con-
verges to zero, regardless of the renegotiation-
proofness constraint.
When the discount factor is high, it does not
matter what happens in the ﬁrst T periods, for T
ﬁnite. However, because we are working with a
Markov process, in the long run the distribution
of types converges to a stationary distribution
which is independent from the initial value.
This implies that at time one the ability of the
consumer to predict his own type realizations in
the far future is almost as good as the seller’s
ability. For this reason, when  is high the
monopolist can separate the agents paying only
a minuscule rent to the higher type.
18
C. Discussion
Before presenting further results, we now dis-
cuss the assumptions of the model, emphasizing
the issues that are still open for future research.
In particular, we focus on the stochastic process,
the utility function, cash constraints, and the
time horizon.
As noted, any change of the contract at time
t has a “cascade” effect on expected utilities in
the previous histories. These effects depend
both on the structure of the constraints that are
binding at the optimum, and on the transition
probabilities, which determine the conditional
expectation of the consumer at each history
node. This is the reason the properties of the
stochastic process are important in the charac-
terization. A key assumption of the model is
that types are positively correlated.
19 When this
is the case, a “high” type has not only a higher
marginal valuation for the good today, but also
a higher expected valuation for a contract in the
future. Without this assumption, a type would
be “high” or “low” depending on which of these
two components of utility prevails. Along with
the rest of the literature on dynamic contract-
ing,
20 we also assume that at any point in time
the type t can assume one of two values. When
there are n possible values, the conditional dis-
tribution of future realization of t is a n  1
dimensional vector, so the characteristics of
each agent are n  1 dimensional. In this case,
besides the problem of dynamic screening,
we would have an additional problem of multi-
dimensional screening. As is well known, in this
case types are not “naturally” ordered, and the
set of constraints that are binding can be more
complicated. The environment studied above
has the advantage of separating the study of
the dynamics of the contract from the study
of the multidimensionality of the types, which
is a conceptually distinct problem, and there-
fore provides a better understanding of the
dynamics.
21
A related issue regards the transition proba-
bilities in the stochastic process. Clearly, many
different assumptions can be made regarding
these probabilities. In this paper, we have con-
sidered the case in which the transition proba-
bilities do not change over time. This, however,
is not essential for the characterization: indeed
even if the degree of positive correlation
changes over time (but remains positive), we
would be able to perform the same simpliﬁca-
tion of the incentive constraints as in
Lemma 1.
22 Another assumption of the model is
that the transition probabilities between types
18 It is worthwhile to point out the differences between
this result and the results in Proposition 1 and 2 because the
logic of their proofs is different. The proof of Proposition 4
does not require the assumption that types are positively
correlated. For this reason, Proposition 4 is stronger than the
result that would have followed from taking the limit in the
formula of Proposition 1 as  3 1. However, while Prop-
osition 1 characterizes the optimal contract for any , Prop-
osition 4 is only a limit result. Even in the limit case in
which  3 1, Proposition 4 shows that the contract con-
verges to an efﬁcient contract in probability, but it is silent
on the behavior of the contract in any single history.
19 This assumption is used in the characterization of the
optimal contract, but not in Proposition 4.
20 See, e.g., Hart and Tirole (1988), Laffont and Tirole
(1990), and Rustichini and Wolinsky (1995).
21 At the cost of higher complexities, the model can be
extended to multidimensional types. Indeed, even in a mul-
tidimensional environment, types can be “endogenously”
ordered to simplify the set of incentive constraints (see, for
example, Jean-Charles Rochet, 1987).
22 In this case the optimal contract would not depend on
the likelihood ratio  raised to the t as in Proposition 2, but
on the multiplication of the changing likelihood ratios along
the lowest history. For this extension, we would also need to
continue assuming that a high type remains more likely to
be high in the future.
646 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW JUNE 2005are all positive, although they may be small: this
precludes a case in which there is a type i which
will never become some other type j.
23 An
interesting extension of the model could be to
consider a process with more than two types and
a form of long-term heterogeneity in which
different transition probabilities correspond to
each initial type. A systematic analysis of the
properties of the stochastic process and the ex-
tension to the case of dynamic screening with
multidimensional types is left for future
research.
Regarding the utility and the cost function,
the results can easily be extended to the case in
which the cost function is a generic convex
function and utility is a generic function u(t, q),
provided that the usual single crossing condi-
tion is assumed.
24 A relevant assumption, how-
ever, is that the utility is quasilinear (as
generally assumed in the literature on nonlinear
pricing). When the utility function is not quasi-
linear, we have an additional issue of consump-
tion smoothing over time. In this case, too, the
analysis of the quasilinear case allows us to
separate the dynamic screening problem from
the conceptually different problem of consump-
tion shooting.
25
As standard in the literature, we do not im-
pose cash constraints on the consumer’s
choice.
26 At the cost of additional complica-
tions, it would be a simple exercise to incorpo-
rate these constraints in our model. Under
plausible assumptions, however, these con-
straints would be irrelevant for the analysis. In
the model, monetary transfers can always be
bounded above in all periods by a ﬁnite upper
bound which is generally very small. For exam-
ple, the upper bound on monetary transfers
depends (among other variables) on the persis-
tence of agents’ types: as persistence converges
to one, the per-period payments converge to the
same payments as in the static model. If we
assume that cash constraints are satisﬁed in the
standard static version of the model, then when
types are sufﬁciently persistent (as perhaps rea-
sonable to assume when consumption is fre-
quent), cash constraints would not be binding in
our dynamic model either.
Finally, we turn to the time horizon. Besides
a direct theoretical interest, the analysis of a
stationary model with inﬁnite periods is useful
for two reasons. First, with this assumption we
can study long-term behavior and convergence
of the contract, which would be impossible in
a two-period model. It is also instrumental,
however, in the study of price dynamics. For
example, we will show that the transfer price of
the monopolist’s technology is declining over
time. Since the model is stationary, the true
value of the technology is constant and identical
in any period. Therefore, this decline in price
arises purely for strategic reasons: in a nonsta-
tionary model with ﬁnite periods we would not
be able to separate the strategic effect from the
natural decline in value due to the shorter hori-
zon. It is, however, easy to show that our char-
acterization would be valid even in a model
with T periods.
IV. Property Rights
Before presenting results on the monetary
transfers, it is useful to discuss property rights,
since their allocation typically (although not
necessarily) inﬂuences the ﬂow of monetary
transfers. Up to this point, we have assumed that
the monopolist has the right to decide the quan-
tity supplied in every period. Instead of selling
output on a period-by-period basis, however,
the monopolist may decide to sell the property
rights of her exclusive technology to the con-
sumer. Only the consumer beneﬁts directly
from the technology and has information for its
efﬁcient use. It is therefore natural to expect that
the property rights are ultimately acquired by
the agent who has a superior valuation of its
future use. The decision to transfer property
rights, however, depends on the history of the
agent’s types:
23 This environment, however, can be approximated
since transition probabilities can be arbitrarily small.
24 This requires the cross derivative uq to be positive.
When the utility and cost functions are generic functions,
however, the ﬁrst-order conditions do not necessarily yield
closed form solutions. All the results, however, continue to
hold in this more general environment (see Battaglini and
Coate, 2003, for details).
25 The results, however, are robust to changes in the
degree of risk aversion. In Battaglini and Coate (2003) we
show that when risk aversion is below a critical value, the
characterization with risk aversion is the same as the char-
acterization without risk aversion and a small change in risk
aversion would imply only a small change in the contract.
26 Cash constraints limit the maximum amount of per-
period monetary transfers between the principal and the
agent. Clearly, such constraints can be incorporated in both
a dynamic model and a static model.
647 VOL. 95 NO. 3 BATTAGLINI: LONG-TERM CONTRACTING WITH MARKOVIAN CONSUMERSPROPOSITION 5: Without loss of generality,
the optimal contract offers a call option to buy
out the ﬁrm to the agent as soon as he reveals
himself to be a high type. However, the monop-
olist never ﬁnds it optimal to sell the ﬁrm to an
agent who has always revealed himself to be a
low type.
The ﬁrst part of this result should not be
surprising. After the agent reveals himself to be
a high type, there is no residual asymmetric
information. At this stage, and before the real-
ization of the type in the following period, we
should expect no reason for the monopolist to
keep the ownership of the technology.
27 The
interesting observation, however, is in the sec-
ond part of the proposition: after a history in
which the agent has never revealed he is a high
type, the monopolist ﬁnds it strictly suboptimal
to sell the ﬁrm and prefers to introduce a dis-
tortion in the value of the ﬁrm, not only in the
period in which the type is revealed, but also in
the subsequent periods.
28 Indeed, as we dis-
cussed in Section III A, the distortion is intro-
duced to extract surplus from the high type.
This suggests that it is natural to observe a
distortion in the period in which the agent re-
veals his type. But this does not explain why the
monopolist still wants to introduce a distortion
in the following periods: given that the agent
has revealed his low type, there is no asymmet-
ric information anymore in this case either. This
characteristic of the optimal contract depends
on the dynamic nature of the incentive con-
straint and it is instructive to see why it is true.
Consider a simple two-period example. As-
sume that after the declaration in period 1 the
monopolist sells the ﬁrm to the agent irrespec-
tive of the type. In the second period the agent
would receive all the surplus, i.e., 1⁄2 H
2 if he is
a high type and 1⁄2 L
2 if he is a low type. This
implies that the high type receives a rent, i.e., an
extra payoff with respect to the lower type,
equal to Rown  1⁄2 (H  L). This rent is
higher than the minimal rent that would guar-
antee truthful revelation: the incentive compat-
ibility constraint requires only a rent equal to
RIC  L  Rown. Imagine now that the
monopolist, after the agent reveals himself to be
a low type, keeps the ownership in order to
reduce the rent of the high type at t  2, instead
of selling the ﬁrm. Assume, in particular, that
instead of selling the good at cost in the second
period, she sells to the high type H units at
price 1⁄2 H
2  , i.e., she reduces the extra rent
of the high type by  in case in period 1 the
agent declares to be a low type. For  small, the
contract remains incentive compatible in the
second period. In order to satisfy the constraints
at t  1, suppose that the monopolist reduces
the price paid by the low type by  Pr(HL)
dollars. The low type’s incentives in period 1
are unchanged: if he reports himself to be a low
type, he receives  Pr(HL) dollars more in
t  1 and he expects to receive  Pr(HL) less
at t  2; moreover, the contract does not change
if the agent chooses to report himself to be a
high type. Consider now the impact of this
change on the incentive compatibility constraint
of the high type at t  1. If the high type
deviates and reports himself to be a low type, he
receives  Pr(HL) more, the same as the low
type since this is paid “in cash” at t  1 with a
reduced price. However, the expected loss for
the high type is  Pr(HH) because he is more
optimistic than the low type about the future.
Since [Pr(HL)  Pr(HH)] is negative,
this implies that the outside option of the high
type, i.e., the utility of reporting untruthfully,
has a lower value and the monopolist can induce
truthful revelation by leaving a lower rent to the
high type at t  1. The monopolist, therefore,
prefers to keep strict ownership of the ﬁrm:
ownership enables control of the rent of the
agent in the second period, and this control is
important to extract surplus in the sale of the
technology to the high type in the ﬁrst period.
The characterization of the optimal contract in
(2) goes beyond this observation. In our inﬁnite
and stationary environment, in fact, the monop-
olist ﬁnds it optimal to reduce the efﬁciency of
the ﬁrm for potentially inﬁnite periods, until she
hears a “high-type” report. Moreover, as we will
prove in Section V, the dynamics of the transfer
price of the technology will be dictated by the
dynamics of the optimal inefﬁciency in supply.
27 Note that this result is different from the classical
results by Jeremy Bulow (1982) concerning the trade-off
between the sale and the rental of a durable good. In this
literature, in fact, if a durable good is sold, then the quantity
remains constant in the following periods; in our frame-
work, instead, the ﬁrm is selling the technology to produce
the good, and the future quantities depend on the realized
type.
28 I am grateful to Bengt Holmstro ¨m and Asher Wolin-
sky who have independently suggested this point.
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As mentioned above, two payment schedules
with the same present value can give the same
incentives to an agent; therefore the prices
charged in the optimal contract are not uniquely
identiﬁed. Indeed, although it is true that we can
assume without loss of generality that the opti-
mal contract keeps the lowest type at his reser-
vation utility in any period, we can construct
equilibrium contracts that do not have this fea-
ture: an example is the contract in which the
monopolist sells the technology to the agent. In
general, when we have many periods, we can
ﬁnd optimal contracts in which the monopolist
receives a large payment at some date t and she
commits to pay it back in installments. The
installments can, in principle, follow any time
pattern. In this section, we focus on two types of
optimal monetary transfers that seem more in-
teresting from a theoretical and empirical point
of view.
For any contract in which the monopolist
borrows money and repays it in an arbitrary
time pattern, we can distinguish two parts: a
supply contract in which the relevant ICht(H)
and IRht(L) constraints are satisﬁed as equali-
ties, and a residual lending contract, in which
the monopolist borrows some amount of money
and pays it back over time to the agent. A
reason why the supply contract is more inter-
esting than other contracts is that if we assume
that the monopolist is even slightly more patient
than the agent, she would never ﬁnd it optimal
to ask the agent to anticipate payments for fu-
ture supply (as occurs when the technology is
sold to the agent), and therefore all the con-
straints would be binding after all histories.
29
The lending contract can take (almost) any form
because the monopolist can commit to repay it
according to any time pattern. The supply con-
tract, however, is uniquely determined by the
incentive structure of the model. We can there-
fore ask what is the dynamics of prices and,
more importantly, the dynamics of the consum-
er’s utility in the optimal supply contract.
There is one particular case in which the
monopolist receives anticipated payments from
the consumer, which has special signiﬁcance
from an empirical and theoretical reason: the
contract discussed in Section IV, in which the
monopolist, as soon as compatible with proﬁt
maximization, sells the ﬁrm to the consumer
who reports himself to be a high type. We call
this arrangement the sale-of-the-ﬁrm contract.
In this case, too, the monopolist can add on top
of a sale-of-the-ﬁrm contract a lending contract,
as deﬁned above, in which she borrows more
money than the value of the ﬁrm and repays the
extra amount over time. Since we are not inter-
ested in this case, we assume without loss in
generality that the IRht(L) constraint is satisﬁed
as equality in all periods. Again, if this condi-
tion is satisﬁed, the sale-of-the-ﬁrm contract is
uniquely determined. The interesting question
in this case is the dynamics of the strike price of
the call option on the technology.
30
Regarding the supply contract, we have:
PROPOSITION 6: In the optimal supply con-
tract, the average per-period utility of the agent
starting from any date t is nondecreasing in t in
all possible histories and strictly increasing in
some history; therefore, the expectation at time
zero of the average rent of the agent from date
t is strictly increasing in t.
Recent empirical work has highlighted that in
some important markets long-term contracts are
front-loaded: prices are initially high and de-
cline over time.
31 A consequence of this effect,
therefore, is that the expected utility of a con-
sumer from continuing to remain a monopo-
list’s customer increases over time. Dionne and
Doherty (1994) explain this phenomenon as a
consequence of the possibility to renegotiate
contracts over time. Building on Milton Harris
and Holmstro ¨m (1982), Hendel and Lizzeri
29 If the monopolist is more patient than the agent, then
the incentive compatibility for the low type would be bind-
ing in all periods and the monopolist would not ﬁnd it
optimal to lend money to the agent because the agent would
not be able to commit to repay the debt. Note that the
monopolist’s objective function is continuous in her dis-
count factor and the constraints do not depend on it: there-
fore, an inﬁnitesimal reduction in the monopolist’s discount
factor would have only an inﬁnitesimal impact on the opti-
mal quantities qt(ht), but would eliminate equilibria in
which the monopolist borrows money.
30 I am grateful to William Rogerson who suggested this
point.
31 This effect has been shown with California auto in-
surance data by Dionne and Doherty (1994), and more
recently by Hendel and Lizzeri (2003) in the life insurance
market.
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information, but in which both the principal and
the agent learn over time from a public signal
the type of the agent: front-loading is therefore
a consequence of reclassiﬁcation risk. Our
model suggests a new explanation for this phe-
nomenon in which front-loading is precisely a
consequence of the commitment power of
the seller.
32 Indeed, in the optimal contract,
even without imposing renegotiation con-
straints, she ﬁnds it optimal to promise an efﬁ-
cient contract to the agent if he reports himself
to be a high type, or to provide a contract with
decreasing inefﬁciency. Because of this, she
must commit to pay a rent to the high type that
increases over time because the higher the efﬁ-
ciency of the contract, the more expensive it is
to separate the agents’ types.
We now turn to sale-of-the-ﬁrm contracts. As
we discussed in Section IV, the monopolist
ﬁnds it optimal to sell her technology only if the
agent reveals himself to be a high type. It is
therefore natural to look at the evolution of the
call price of the option to buy the technology
along the history in which it can be exercised
(i.e., when the agent always reveals himself to
be a low type). This question is interesting
because, given the stationary structure of the
model, the present value of the ﬁrm along this
history is constant. Remember that the model
has inﬁnite periods, and because the preferences
of the consumer follow a Markov process, the
value of the ﬁrm depends only on the current
state of the consumer’s type.
33 This fact may
suggest that the price of the ﬁrm is constant over
time. We have, however:
PROPOSITION 7: In the optimal sale-of-the-
ﬁrm contract, the strike price of the call option
to buy out the technology is strictly declining
over time.
What really matters in the determination of
the transfer price of the ﬁrm is the outside
option of the high type (i.e., the value of report-
ing untruthfully). This outside option changes
over time because the contract becomes increas-
ingly efﬁcient along the “lowest” history, and
the improvements in the contract beneﬁt the
high type more than the low type. The higher
efﬁciency of the contract, in fact, increases the
agent’s utility in the event in which he turns into
a high type, and an agent who is a high type
today has a higher probability of being a high
type tomorrow. For this reason, the price for the
service that the low type is willing to pay in-
creases more slowly than the increase in utility
of a deviation for a high type. For this reason,
the outside option of the high type increases
over time. This implies that the only way for the
monopolist to induce a truthful revelation is to
reduce the strike price of the call option on the
property rights of the ﬁrm.
VI. Renegotiation-Proofness
So far we have assumed that the monopolist
can commit to a contractual offer. We discussed
this point above, arguing that this is the most
appropriate assumption in many environments,
in particular when the monopolist is serving
many consumers and is interested in maintain-
ing her reputation, or when renegotiation costs
are larger than the beneﬁts. There are situations,
however, in which the seller cannot commit not
to renegotiating the contract after some histo-
ries. The received literature has shown that if
types are constant, the optimal contract is never
renegotiation-proof. Perhaps surprisingly, given
a condition that is easily satisﬁed, this is no
longer true when the agent’s type follows a
stochastic process.
34 We say that a contract is
renegotiation-proof if after no history ht there is
a new contract starting in period t that the con-
sumer would accept in exchange for the original
contract, and that is strictly superior for the
monopolist. This deﬁnition is standard in the
32 In our model, we assume that the seller has monopoly
power. Clearly, this assumption should be taken into con-
sideration when using the model to interpret evidence in
markets with more competitive environments.
33 In an equilibrium of a direct mechanism, the consumer
would reveal his type truthfully; therefore the ﬁrm would be
sold only to high types. This implies that whenever the ﬁrm
is sold, the expected present value of the ﬁrm is constant,
irrespective of the period in which it is sold.
34 This result should not be confused with the ﬁndings in
Patrick Rey and Bernard Salanie (1990, 1996). Beside the
fact that they consider a different model with moral hazard
and constant types, these authors show that a renegotiation-
proof contract can be implemented by a chain of short-term
contracts (two-period contracts in which the principal can
commit). They do not characterize the renegotiation-proof
contract and they do not prove that the ex ante optimal
contract is renegotiation-proof (which indeed would not be
true in their models with constant types).
650 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW JUNE 2005literature and natural: when a contract is
renegotiation-proof, either the monopolist or the
consumer would reject a revision of the initial
agreement.
PROPOSITION 8: The optimal contract is
renegotiation-proof if Pr(LL)  1 
HPr(HH). Moreover, if this condition is not
satisﬁed, there exists a t such that the
contract is not renegotiation-proof only in the
ﬁrst t periods.
Figure 2 represents the condition of Proposi-
tion 7 in an example in which there is a 30-
percent initial probability that the agent is a high
type: the contract is renegotiation-proof for any
point below the straight “thick line.” As can be
seen from the ﬁgure, the set of parameters for
which the contract is renegotiation-proof covers
most of the set of feasible parameters. (Because
types are positively correlated, Pr(LL) and
Pr(HH) are both larger than 1⁄2 .)
35
The intuition of this result can be seen from
Figure 3.
36 Assume, for the sake of illustra-
tion, that at time t the monopolist is contem-
plating a change only in the quantity offered
after the agent reports a type tj after a
history Xtj1, keeping constant all other
quantities. The complete argument clearly
needs to consider a change on the entire se-
quence of contingent menus: this is a more
sophisticated problem (solved in the Appen-
dix), but this example provides a useful intu-
ition. First, note that a contract is renegotiated
only by a contract that is Pareto superior;
otherwise either the seller or the buyer would
not accept the change. Since welfare is
strictly concave in the quantity supplied, and
the ex ante optimal quantity at time t (i.e.,
q*(tj, Xtj1)) is not larger than the efﬁ-
cient output q
e(tj), it must be that welfare
is strictly increasing in the interval [0,
q*(tj, Xtj1)] (see Figure 3). This im-
plies that the new output q(tj, Xtj1)
prescribed by a renegotiated contract must be
strictly larger than q*(tj, Xtj1).
Consider now a history ht. If the agent has
previously reported himself to be a high type,
then the contract is efﬁcient and not renego-
tiable; assume therefore that the agent has
always reported himself to be a low type. If
after ht the monopolist could choose any
other continuation contract, the quantity sup-
plied after a history htj following or equal to
ht in the new contract would be q
R(tj,
35 If we measure the persistence of types by  
max{Pr(LL), Pr(HH)}, an immediate implication of
Proposition 8 is that, given any initial prior, there is an
upper bound (H) on persistence such that for   (H)
the optimal contract is renegotiation-proof (area below the
semicircle in Figure 2).
36 The two concave functions in the ﬁgure represent the
proﬁts and welfare generated in period t  j after history
xtj1: q*(tj, Xtj1) is the optimal contract, q
e(tj)i s
the efﬁcient contract, and q
R(tj, Xtj1) is the contract
that is ex post optimal after history ht.
FIGURE 2. THE RENEGOTIATION-PROOFNESS CONDITION
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(tj, Xj1)
j1. This formula is identical to the
formula of the ex ante optimal contract in Prop-
osition 2, except that instead of the prior H,w e
use the appropriate posterior after ht, Pr(HL),
and the state Xtj is started afresh at time t.
Comparing q
R(tj, Xtj1) with the contract
in Proposition 2, it is easy to verify that the ex
ante optimal q*(tj, Xtj1) is larger than the










which is always satisﬁed if Pr(LL)  1 
HPr(HH) since t  1. (Obviously, the
contract can be renegotiated only starting
from the second period.) Because the proﬁt
function is also strictly concave, this implies
that when (4) holds, any quantity larger than
q*(tj, Xtj1) reduces expected proﬁts at
ht. But then any change that would be ac-
cepted at ht by the customer would necessar-
ily reduce proﬁts, implying that the quantity
q*(tj, Xtj1) would not be renegotiated
at any time t.
When types are constant, the optimal
renegotiation-proof contract requires the con-
sumer to play sophisticated mixed strategies,
and this may appear unrealistic. These strategies
are necessary to guarantee that, after any pos-
sible history, the monopolist’s posterior be-
liefs are such that there are no ex post Pareto
superior contracts. The result presented above,
however, shows that when types are correlated
but follow a stochastic process, even if the
correlation level is very high (as in Fig-
ure 2), consumers do not need to use mixed
strategies in equilibrium, but simply truthfully
report their type. The conﬂict between optimal-
ity and renegotiation-proofness, and the sophis-
tication of equilibrium strategies necessary to
guarantee the latter property, therefore, are im-
plications of the assumption that types are con-
stant or very highly correlated.
37
VII. Conclusion
This paper shows that a long-term contractual
relationship in which the type of the buyer is
constant over time is qualitatively different
from a contractual relationship in which the
type follows a Markov process, even if the types
are highly persistent. While in the ﬁrst case the
contract is constant, in the second the contract is
truly dynamic and converges to the efﬁcient
contract. Even if the environment has only one-
period memory and risk-neutral agents, the op-
timal contract is not stationary and has
unbounded memory. The structure of the opti-
mal contract, however, is remarkably simple. In
analogy with the static model, we have a stron-
ger version of the generalized no distortion at
the top principle, which implies that the entire
state-contingent contract becomes forever efﬁ-
cient as soon as the agent reports himself to be
37 A complete analysis of the mixed strategy equilibrium
in the optimal renegotiation-proof contract with variable
types when (4) is not satisﬁed is presented in Battaglini
(2005).
FIGURE 3. THE EX POST MAXIMIZATION PROBLEM AFTER A HISTORY ht
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we also have a novel vanishing distortion at the
bottom principle which clearly could not be
appreciated in a static model.
With constant types there always is a conﬂict
between optimality and renegotiation-proofness,
and the latter property is guaranteed only if
consumers use sophisticated mixed strategies.
With stochastic types, in contrast, even if there
is high persistence, the optimal contract is
renegotiation-proof for natural speciﬁcations of
the parameters. Consumers, moreover, adopt
simple pure strategies.
The dynamic theory of contracting presented
in the paper also provides insights into the own-
ership structure of the monopolist’s exclusive
technology and contributes to explaining some
empirical ﬁndings. The monopolist may ﬁnd it
optimal to keep the ownership of the technology
even when it would be inefﬁcient in order to
control the agents’ future rents and therefore
maximize rent extraction. This inefﬁcient reten-
tion of property rights may potentially last for
an arbitrarily large number of periods, but the
allocation of property rights will be efﬁcient
with probability one in the long term.
APPENDIX
PROOF OF LEMMA 1:
For a generic maximization program P,w e
deﬁne V(P), the value of the objective function
at the optimum. Let us also deﬁne P I
R the
program in which expected proﬁt is maximized
only under the incentive compatibility con-
straints of the high type and the individual ra-
tionality constraints of the low type: ICht(H),
IRht(L) @ht. We proceed in two steps.
CLAIM 1:
If 	p, q
 solves P I
R, then there exists a p such
that 	p, q
 satisﬁes IRht(L) and ICht(H) as





Given a solution 	p, q
, we ﬁrst show that the
price vector can be modiﬁed to guarantee that
all the incentive constraints are satisﬁed as equal-
ities without reducing the value of the program;
then we show that the resulting contract with
incentive constraints satisﬁed as equalities can be
modiﬁed to make the individual rationality con-
straints satisﬁed as equalities as well, while leav-
ing the incentive constraints untouched and
keeping the value of the program constant.
Step 1: We show the result by induction. Let t
be a ﬁnite integer. Assume that for any solution
	p, q
 of P I




 is also a solution of P I
R; and all
incentive compatibility constraints are satisﬁed
as equalities up to period t, the value of the
objective function is unchanged, and p
t is iden-
tical to p in any period j  t: p
t(; hj)  p(;
hj) for j  t. This step is clearly satisﬁed for t 
1, since in this period the incentive compatibil-
ity constraint is necessarily binding at the opti-
mum. We now show that if p
t exists @t  t,
then there must be a price vector p
t1 such that
all the incentive compatibility constraints are
satisﬁed as equalities up to period t  1, p
t1 is
identical to p in any period j  t  1, and the
value of the objective function is unchanged.
Given the induction step, assume without loss
of generality that the incentive constraints are
satisﬁed as equalities for any j  t. There are
two cases to consider. Assume ﬁrst that at pe-
riod t  1, after a history ht1  {ht, HL}, the
high type receives an expected continuation
utility equal to the utility he would receive if he
declares to be a low type plus a constant   0.
Modify the contract so that the new prices after
histories {ht1, H} and {ht1, L} are re-
spectively p
t1(H; ht1)  p(H; ht1)   and
p(L; ht1)  p(L; ht1);
38 simultaneously,
reduce the price after history {ht, L} so that
p
t1(L; ht)  p(L; ht)   Pr(HL). We call
this new price vector p ˆ
t1. This change would
not reduce the monopolist’s expected proﬁt, it
would not violate IRht(L) in any period, it
would not violate the incentive compatibility
constraints for histories following ht, and it
would satisfy ICht1(H) as equality. Consider
now the ICht(H) constraint at ht. The utility of a
high type that is truthful U(H; ht) is unchanged;
if the high type reports himself to be a low type,
however, he would receive:
(A1) UH; ht1 	 PrHL
 PrHHUH; ht1
38 Remember that p(; ht) is the price charged after
history ht if the agent declared to be a type ,s oi ti st h e
price charged after a history {ht, }.
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types are positively correlated. It follows that
IChj(H) are satisﬁed for any j  t, and 	p ˆ
t1, q

is a solution of P I
R. By the induction step we
can ﬁnd a new price vector p
t1 which is such
that the incentive compatibility constraints are
satisﬁed as equalities in all periods j  t, and
that is identical to p ˆ
t1 for periods j  t (which
is identical to p in periods l  t  1). Since this
change does not affect prices at t  1 and
following periods, in correspondence to p
t1
the incentive compatibility is satisﬁed as equal-
ity @t  t  1, prices are equal to the prices in
p for periods j  t  1, and the value function
is equal to the original.
Assume now that at period t  1, after some
history ht  {ht1, H}, the high type receives
a utility equal to the utility he would receive if
he declares to be a low type plus a constant  
0. Modify the contract so that the new prices
after histories {ht, H} and {ht, L} are respec-
tively p
t1(H; ht)  p(H; ht)   and p
t1(L;
ht)  p(L; ht); simultaneously, reduce prices
after history {ht, H} so that p
t1(H; ht1) 
p(H; ht1)   Pr(HH). This new con-
tract p
t1 would leave all the constraints of the
relaxed problem satisﬁed @ht and the incentive
constraint satisﬁed as equalities in the ﬁrst t 
1 periods. And it would not reduce proﬁts.
Step 2: By the previous step we can assume
without loss of generality that all the incentive
compatibility constraints are satisﬁed as equal-
ities. We now show that the individual rational-
ity constraints can also be reduced to equalities.
It can be veriﬁed that the individual rationality
constraint must be binding at t  1. Again, we
prove the result for the remaining periods by
induction. Assume that in all periods j  t,
IRhj(L) holds as equality and that the expected
utility of a low type agent after history ht1 is

  0. Consider an increase by 
 of the prices
charged in the period t  1, p
t1(; ht, i) 
p(; ht, i)  
 @; and a reduction of the price
at time t so that p
t1(; ht1)  p(; ht1) 

 @. Clearly, this change would not violate
the constraints of P I
R, would leave the incentive
compatibility constraints untouched, and would
satisfy all the individual rationality constraint as




Any solution of PII satisﬁes all the constraints




R)  V(PII), we need only show
that, in correspondence to the solution of PII,
after any history ht the low type does not want
to imitate the high type (i.e., the ICht(L) con-
straint is satisﬁed) and the high type receives at
least his reservation value (i.e., the IRht(H) con-
straint is satisﬁed). This guarantees that
V(PI)  V(P I
R) and hence the result.
Step 1: the ICht(L) constraints. Note that by
ICht(H) and IRht(L), after any history ht:
pH; ht  pL; ht 
qH; ht  qL; htL
	  PrHLUH, ht
	 qH; ht  qL; ht
	 PrHH  PrHLUH, ht
where p(i; ht)i  H, L is the price charged after
the agent declares to be a type i and U(H, ht) 
U(H; ht, H)  U(H; ht, L), the difference
between the rent of a high type after a H and a L
declaration (the continuation value of a low type is
zero in PII). As can be seen from (2), in corre-
spondence to the solution of PII,
39 after an agent
declares to be a high type an efﬁcient contract is
offered in the optimal solution of the relaxed prob-
lem; so using ICht(H) and IRht(L) we can write:









e(L) is the efﬁcient quantity
when the type is L. If the agent reports himself to
be a low type, on the contrary, he will receive an
inefﬁcient quantity q*(Lh) that is never strictly
higher than the efﬁcient level q
e(L): therefore his
continuation value is not higher than U(H;ht,H).
39 The formal derivation of (2) is in the proof of Prop-
osition 1 below.
654 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW JUNE 2005So U(H; ht, H)  U(H; ht, L)  0 for any ht;
and, since types are positively correlated,
(Pr(HH)Pr(HL))U(H,ht)0. It follows
that:
pH; ht  pL; ht  qH; ht
 qL; htL 	  PrHLUH, ht
which implies that ICht(L) is satisﬁed at ht.
Step 2: the IRht(H) constraints. By ICht(H)
and IRht(L) we have:
qH; htH  pH; ht
	  PrHHUH; ht, H  PrHH
 PrLLUH; ht, L  0
and therefore IRht(H) is satisﬁed as well.
We can now prove Lemma 1. Assume that 	p,
q
 solves PII; then, by Claim 1 and 2 it must
also solve PI. Assume that 	p, q
 solves PI;
then, by Claim 2 it must also solve P I
R, since
V(P I
R)  V(PI). By Claim 1 there exists a p
such that 	p, q
 solves PII and achieves the
same value as PI. We conclude that q solves PI
if and only if it solves PII.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1:
Let us deﬁne ht
L : {L, L, ... L}, the history
along which the agent always reports himself to
be a low type for t  1 periods. Using the fact
that ICht(H) and IRht(L) are equalities, we can
formulate the utility of the high type at time 1
as:
UH; h1  q* 1Lh1 	 H  L

q* 2Lh2





This formula can be written as








Using the equality IRh1(L) we know that the low
type receives zero at time one. It follows that PII
can be represented as:

















where the ﬁrst summation is the expected sur-
plus generated by the supply contract (W(i; j)
is the expected social welfare generated by the
contract from period 2 if the realization in pe-
riod 1 is j and the realization in period 2 is i.)
We have two possible cases:
Case 1: ht  {ht1, }  Ht
ht
L @t  1. The
ﬁrst-order condition implies q* t(ht)  , and
the contract is efﬁcient.
Case 2: ht  ht
L @t  1. The ﬁrst-order condi-
tion with respect to a generic quantity offered











which completes the characterization of the op-
timal contract.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4:
Starting in period t from any history {ht, },
the expected ﬁrst best surplus from time t on-
ward is independent from t and equal to
W* t()  ¥jt 
jtEt[1⁄2 j
2t  ]. Consider a
contract c in which a ﬁxed fee F  W* 1(L)i s
charged in period 1 and then an efﬁcient menu
plan in which q()  , p()  1⁄2 
2 for any
  1 is offered. This contract is clearly incentive
compatible and individually rational for any  
1; moreover, it is renegotiation-proof since it is
efﬁcient. Therefore it is a feasible option in the
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proofness constraint must be satisﬁed, and must
yield an average proﬁt not larger than the proﬁt of
the optimal contract *. This implies
















where w*() is the per-period Marshalian
surplus when the type is .A s 3 1, the
right-hand side can be written as












where t ˆ is a ﬁnite integer. Since (C5) must
holds for any t ˆ  1 and limt ˆ3(; t ˆ)  0
(because the process converges to a stationary
distribution), we have that lim31(1  )*
must be equal to lim31(1  )E[¥1


1w*()]. This also implies that the
agent’s average payoff is zero.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5:
Since the optimal contract is efﬁcient after
the agent reveals himself to be a high type, the
monopolist ﬁnds it optimal to offer to the con-
sumer the same quantities that the consumer
himself would choose if he could directly con-
trol supply. The ﬁrst part of the result then
follows from the fact that all players have quasi-
linear utilities and therefore they are indifferent
between paying or receiving a positive amount
every period, or a large amount equal to the
future expected payments at some period and
zero afterward. The second part follows from
the fact that from (2) we know that along the
“lowest history,” supply is distorted in the fu-
ture with positive probability, and the monopo-
list cannot achieve these distortions without
control of the technology.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6:
When IRht(L) is satisﬁed as equality for all
ht, the low type receives zero expected utility in
all periods. Therefore we need only show that
the average utility of the high type is nonde-
creasing in time. Using (2) and the incentive com-















where U(H; t, Xt1) is the expected utility of a
high type at time t given the state Xt1. Consider
now two periods: t and tt. It is easy to show
that U(H; t, Xt1)  U(H; t, Xt1) is propor-
tional to X(L, Xt1)  X(L, Xt1)[1 
(Pr(HL)/Pr(LL))]
(tt), which is nonnegative
because Xt1 Xt1 and strictly positive if X(L,
Xt1)  1. Therefore, the average rent of the
agent is nondecreasing in any history and strictly
increasing in a nonempty subset of histories. It
follows that, at time zero, the expected average
rent starting from period t is strictly increasing
in t.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 7:
Since the monopolist’s technology is sold as
soon as compatible with proﬁt maximization, its
sale can occur only along a history in which the
agent has always reported himself to be a low
type. Consider any such history ht. The price
P(ht) paid for the technology by the high type is
determined by the equation
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where U(i, j; ht) is the utility of a type i
from declaring to be a type j after a history
ht; and W*(i) is the expected ﬁrst best sur-
plus from time t if the type at t is i.
40 Since
W*(H) is clearly history independent, the
result follows by the fact that supply is in-
creasing over time and therefore U(H, L;
ht) is increasing (see [B2]).
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 8:
Consider the problem of ex post maximiza-
tion faced by the monopolist after a history ht
with t  1 in which the agent has never reported
himself to be a high type. At this stage, expected
proﬁts can be written as:
(G7) Ehtht

 PrHLWH, qH  RqL

	 PrLLWL, qL
where qi i  H, L is the sequence of quantities
in the menus offered if the agent reports himself
to be a type i at t; W(i, qi) is the expected
surplus generated in the contract if the agent is
of type i and qi is offered; and R(qL)i st h e
expected rent of the high type starting from ht
which guarantees incentive compatibility. (By
Lemma 1 it depends only on qL as in [B2], and
the rent of the low type is zero.) Indeed (G7) is
a compact way to write (B3) when the posterior
probability that the type is high starting from ht
is Pr(HL). The monopolist’s ex post problem
(Pex post) consists of maximizing (G7) under the
additional constraint that the expected rents of
the agent are at least as high as the expected
rents starting from ht obtained keeping the orig-
inal, ex ante optimal contract. It is, however,
useful to consider the program (P* ex post)i n
which (G7) is maximized under the additional
constraint that expected welfare is at least as
high as the level achieved with the original ex
ante optimal contract, which, after ht,i sac o n -
stant that we denote W*: ¥iH,L Pr(iL)W(i,
qi)  W*. We denote this constraint (G8). If we
show that the ex ante optimal quantities solve
P* ex post, then they must also solve Pex post and
be renegotiation-proof. The Lagrangian of
P* ex post is:
(G9) LP  1 	 LWH, qH
	 WL, qL]  LRqL
where L is the ex post likelihood ratio
[Pr(HL)/Pr(LL)], and  is the Lagrangian
multiplier associated with (G8). We proceed in
three simple steps:
Step 1:   0. Given that Pr(LL)  1 
HPr(HH) implies (4) @j  0, if   0 then
the solution of (G9) implies that all the quantities
in qH are set efﬁciently and the quantities in qL are
distorted downward more than the solutions of the
ex ante optimal problem (the argument is the same
as in Section VI). But then the welfare constraint
(G8) must be violated, a contradiction.
Step 2: Let ° be the ex ante likelihood ratio
(H/L). We can show that [L/(1  )] 

t1. Indeed, it can be veriﬁed that the quan-
tities following history ht in the optimal solution
of the ex ante problem maximize:
(G10) LA  WH, qH
	 WL, qL  
t1RqL
If [L/(1  )]  
t1, then the solution of
(G9) would be less distorted than the solution of
(G10), implying that the welfare constraint (G8)
is not binding and so   0, a contradiction.
Similarly we can prove that the reverse inequal-
ity is not possible. From [L/(1  )]  
t1
we conclude that the solution of (G9) and (G10)
coincide and the optimal ex ante contract is
renegotiation-proof.
Step 3. Finally, it is easy to see that if
Pr(LL)  1  HPr(HH), then there must
be a ﬁnite t ˜ such that for t  t ˜, then (4) is
satisﬁed, and the argument in steps 1 and 2 is
valid for any t  t ˜.
40 To avoid confusions in what follows, it is worth em-
phasizing that U(j, i; ht) and U(j; ht ˆ, i) are different
objects: the ﬁrst represents the case in which a type j reports
untruthfully to be a type i after a history ht; the second
represents the case in which a type j truthfully reports his
type after a history ht ˆ1  {ht ˆ, i}. Indeed the second
expression is equivalent to U(j, j; ht ˆ, i).
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